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The account given of the proposed reforms of theDutch private company has been inﬂuenced by theexcellent account of them by Mr Marco
Langenboen, Legal Adviser at the Netherlands Ministry of
Justice in his paper Reform of the Private Limited Company in
the Netherlands. This article will also make some mention of
the 2008 proposal that certain companies might have a
double board system or have single tier boards consisting
of executive and non-executive directors (as in the United
Kingdom). Furthermore, it will make brief mention of the
recent proposal for a new Title 6A to be included in Book
2 of the Netherlands Civil Code governing a new type of
semi-public company, the maatschappelijke orderneming
(socially orientated undertaking) which should prove useful
for schools, universities, hospitals, care institutions and
housing corporations.
PROPOSED REFORMS OF THE PRIVATE
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (BESLOTEN
VENNOOTSCHAP MET BEPERKTE
AANSPRAKELIJKHEID, BV)
Motivations for and general characteristics of the
proposed reforms
The latter reforms are not expected to come into effect
until the end of 2009. The reforming Act will be
accompanied by another one, dealing with the effect of the
reform upon the present law. At present, the rules of law
governing the Dutch public and private company are in
general similar. This situation does not give a great deal of
ﬂexibility to the private company. An attempt has been
made to give a brief account of the principal reforms which
are contained in the preliminary draft Bill submitted by the
Ministry of Justice to the Dutch legislature in the text
below. The structure of this account substantially follows
that contained in the paper on the Bill by the legal adviser,
Mr Marco Langendoen, at the Department of Legislation
of the Ministry of Justice of the Netherlands. The reforms
are motivated by a desire to create a simpler and more
ﬂexible legal structure, and are intended to introduce a
new system of protection without any minimum capital
requirements. They aim at removing unnecessary
restrictive rules and legal uncertainties, and giving added
freedom to shareholders to choose their favoured type of
organisation, whilst providing guarantees for minority
shareholders and other interested parties.
The preliminary draft Bill also endeavours to reduce the
number of mandatory legal provisions and lessen the
regulatory burden on companies. It was largely based upon
the report of a group of experts under the chairmanship of
Professor de Kluiver. It was also inspired by studies in
comparative law and, in particular, by the law of the
Netherlands Antilles governing private companies; the
comparative studies also considered the United States
Revised Model Business Corporation Act, the law of
Delaware, New Zealand and Australian law. The proposals
are partly aimed at making the Dutch private company a
useful form for subsidiaries of Dutch companies in other
EU Member States, which beneﬁt from the rules of
Community law governing freedom of movement set out in
such cases as Centros (Case C-212/97, Centros [1999] ECR
1-1459) and Inspire Art (Case C467/02 Inspire Art [2003]
ECR 1-10155). They will involved a number of alterations
in the provisions of Book 2 of the Netherlands Civil Code
concerning private companies.
Proposals aimed at flexibility
Certain of these proposals govern the general meeting and
shareholders’ rights, whilst others involve the internal
structure of the company. Under the existing rules
governing the besloten vennootschap (BV) voting rights are in
principle proportional to the nominal value of the shares.
The new proposals permit a different distribution of voting
rights. An alteration of the articles so permitting will
require a unanimous vote at the general meeting
(preliminary draft Bill, art 228(4)). It appears that voteless
(but not no-par value) shares will also be permitted
(preliminary draft Bill, art 228(5)). It will also be possible
to issue shares which do not participate in the proﬁts or
reserves (art 216(7) ibid). Certain existing restrictions on
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the possibility of making decisions outside the general
meeting will be removed. According to the reform
proposals, such decision making will be possible where all
the persons entitled to attend the meeting so agree (art
238(1) ibid). If all the shareholders are also directors of the
company, the annual accounts may be adopted by this
method unless the articles otherwise provide (art 238(3)
ibid). Shareholders will be permitted to express the
nominal value of the shares in a foreign currency; at
present this must be expressed in euros, in accordance
with article 178(2).
Signiﬁcant amendments will also be made to article 242(1)
of Book 2 of the Netherlands Civil Code, which provides
that the directors shall be appointed by the general
meeting. The new form of article 242(1) will provide that
the ﬁrst directors shall be appointed in the deed of
incorporation whilst later ones shall be appointed by the
general meeting, or if the articles so provide, by a meeting
of shareholders of a particular kind or class, at which each
shareholder having a voting right may vote for the
appointment of at least one director. A similar rule will be
applicable to the appointment of members of the
supervisory board, except where the company is a large
company to which the rules governing such companies are
applicable. The new possibilities concerning the
appointment of directors and members of the supervisory
board should be of assistance in structuring joint venture
companies.
The general meeting of a Dutch private company will be
able to take place outside the Netherlands if all the
shareholders and all other persons entitled to attend the
meeting so agree (art 226(2) ibid). According to the
proposed new article 220(1) of Book 2 of the Civil Code,
a shareholder or shareholders who represent at least 1 per
cent of the share capital will be able to demand a general
meeting which must be called within four weeks. The
directors and the supervisory board (if any) are both
required to ensure that this takes place.
As is clearly pointed out in Mr Langendoen’s explanatory
paper which has been cited above, certain of the proposed
changes in the law will affect the internal structure of the
company. Provision has been made for more ﬂexible
internal structures by removing the requirement contained
in article 195 of Book 2 of the Civil Code that the articles
should contain a restriction on transfers of shares to third
parties. It will still be possible for the articles of the
company to contain such a restriction, even a prohibition
for a limited period of time. It is clear from article 192(1)
of the preliminary draft that the articles will be able, with
the consent of all the shareholders, or of all the
shareholders of a particular kind or class, to provide that
such shareholders should have obligations towards the
company, or third parties, or towards each other, of a
contractual character. The provision governing obligations
between the members will, when enacted, represent a
change in the law. It is now recognised that the articles may
impose obligations towards the company. According to
proposed article 192(3), a shareholder who fails to comply
with an obligation resulting from article 192(1) may have
his voting rights, rights to a dividend, or rights to attend
meetings suspended in accordance with the provisions of
the articles. Agreements contained in the articles will bind
future shareholders of the company.
Increased legal certainty
The need for legal certainty is reﬂected in certain of the
provisions which relate to minority protection, which
protection is emphasised in the rules governing private
companies in many states. Thus all shareholders in a Dutch
private company are (and will be under the new proposed
provisions) entitled to participate in a general meeting.
According to article 227(2) of the preliminary draft Bill,
these will include those who have granted a usufruct in
respect of, or pledged, their shares, and who have no voting
rights, unless the articles provided that such shareholders
have no such entitlement. A unanimous vote of all the
shareholders will be required if the articles are altered, so
as to introduce ﬂexible voting rights, the vote will be
required to take place at a meeting where all the issed share
capital is represented (art 228(4) ibid). According to article
228(5) of the preliminary draft Bill, if the articles are to
provide that certain shares belonging to a particular class or
of a particular kind are to have no voting rights, all the
shareholders of the company must agree to this proposal.
A unanimous vote will be required if the transferability of
shares is to be excluded for a period of time. It will have to
take place at a meting at which all the issued capital of the
company is represented.
The rules governing minority protection contained in the
court procedures permitting the withdrawal of
shareholders who have been unfairly prejudiced by the
actions of other shareholders, or the compulsory exit of
shareholders who have acted to the detriment of others
contained in article 336 et seq of Book 2 of the Civil Code,
have been stigmatised as unsatisfactory and uncertain in
their effect. In one notorious case, Hoffman v. Hoffman, JOR
2005/57, the procedure took 14 years to complete, which
was a shorter period than in Jarndyce v Jarndyce. The
abbreviation JOR stands for Jurisprudentie Onderneming &
Recht. The preliminary draft Bill is designed to improve
this procedure by abolishing intermediate rights of appeal
and making it possible for the decision of the court relating
to the withdrawal of the shareholder also to pronounce on
damage claims (art 343(3), ibid).
The present system of valuation of shares by independent
experts will be maintained. However, it is clear from article
337(1) of the preliminary draft Bill that this system may be
replaced by relevant provisions of the articles, or of an
agreement governing dispute settlement, except where the
arrangement would make the transfer of shares impossible
or considerably difﬁcult. According to draft article 337(2),
a dispute may also be settled by the business section 29
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(ondernemingskamer) of the Court of Appeal at Amsterdam,
or by arbitration.
The status of the holders of certiﬁcates has given rise to
uncertainties in the Netherlands. Such certiﬁcates are in
common use in the Netherlands and Belgium. In the
Netherlands, the shares are owned by a foundation
(administratatiekantoor) which exercises the votes attached to
the shares. The certiﬁcates are issued by the foundation,
and their holders enjoy the ﬁnancial rights attaching to
them, including the right to a dividend, subject to a speciﬁc
agreement. Article 227(2) of the preliminary draft Bill
makes it clear that the company’s articles may grant the
right to attend the general meeting to the certiﬁcate
holders. There were previous uncertainties concerning this
matter. The names and addresses of the certiﬁcate holders
should be entered in the company’s register.
Share capital and creditor protection
The preliminary draft Bill does not provide for any
minimum capital requirement for the private company. No
such requirement exists in United Kingdom or French law.
The utility of such a requirement has been doubted on the
grounds that it does not guarantee that the capital is
available at the time when a creditor seeks payment.
Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the amount of
capital available for distribution is based upon the annual
accounts which have been drawn up in the previous year,
which are frequently out of date at the time of the
distribution. The minimum capital requirement has also
been regarded as unsatisfactory because it applies both to
large and small businesses. Certain Dutch rules which bear
a relationship to those governing the maintenance of
capital are somewhat complex, and may not be very
effective. The proposal that the minimum capital
requirement should be abolished was made after two
research projects had been carried out in the Netherlands,
one of which was of a comparative law nature and
considered Australian, New Zealand and Delaware law as
well as the Revised Model Business Corporation Act.
It is also proposed that there should no longer be any
valuation by an independent expert in relation to
contributions in kind. This is now required by articles 204a
and 204b of Book 2 of the Civil Code. The preliminary
draft Bill amends these provisions, and requires the
company’s directors to give a description, including a
valuation of such a contribution. The rules governing the
acquisition of assets from related persons within two years
of incorporation (Nachgründung) now contained in article
204c of Book 2 of the Civil Code will be repealed. Article
121 of the Second Company Law Directive only imposes
this requirement on public companies.
The preliminary draft Bill proposes a number of changes
to the capital maintenance regime. All forms of
distribution to shareholders, including distributions out of
proﬁts and reserves, acquisition of shares by the company
itself and capital reductions will be subject to a balance
sheet test and a liquidity test. The distribution cannot take
place without the approval of the board (see arts 207(1)
and 216(2) ibid). According to the balance sheet test the
directors may not distribute those reserves which must be
maintained by the law or the articles. The liquidity test has
been deﬁned on page 9 of the explanatory memorandum
concerning the proposal as requiring that, before the
distribution is made, the directors must check whether,
after the distribution has occurred, the company will be
able to pay its debts as they fall due.
The balance sheet test has encountered considerable
criticism. It has thus been argued that a negative balance
sheet test does not necessarily mean that a company is
unable to pay its debts as they fall due. The liquidity test
has also been criticised on a number of grounds. It is thus
doubtful whether contingent or prospective liabilities or
assets should be taken into account, and whether it should
be restricted to a particular period of time, for example the
12 months following the proposed distribution (see the
discussion in the article by L Lennarts, “Directors and
Shareholders’ Liability: Protecting Creditors of the BV”, 8
EBOLR 2007, p 136 at pp 139-140.
If the directors are aware or should have been aware that
the company would be unable to continue to pay its debts
after the distribution, they are jointly and severally liable
for the amount of the distribution plus statutory interest
thereon. A director is not so liable if he cannot be blamed
for the wrongful distribution and was not negligent in
taking measures to avoid its consequences (see arts 207(3)
and 216(3) ibid which are in very similar terms in many
respects). If the company becomes bankrupt within one
year of making the distribution, a person who receives the
distribution within that period of time and is then aware or
might reasonably be expected to be aware that, after such
distribution, the company cannot be expected to pay its
debts as they fall due, must return the amount of the
distribution to the company with interest at the statutory
rate (see art 216(3) ibid). A similar obligation is imposed
on a person from whom the company purchases its own
shares by article 207(3) ibid. Such a person may well be a
director of the company. The reversed burden of proof in
the event of bankruptcy within one year has been subjected
to criticism both in relation to directors and shareholders.
The rules governing the liabilities of directors and
shareholders of a private company contained in the
proposal are somewhat draconian and may possibly
dissuade some persons from membership of such
companies, or from becoming directors thereof. They may
well undergo revision before the Bill is enacted.
Concluding remarks on the private company
The reform of the Dutch private company may do
something to increase its attractiveness as a subsidiary of
companies established in other member states of the EU30
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and elsewhere. It is doubtful whether it will prove so
attractive a vehicle for this purpose as the United Kingdom
private company. Although there will obviously be less
emphasis on mandatory rules, and certain unnecessarily
restrictive rules will be repealed, certain of the proposed
reforming legislation seems somewhat burdensome and
complex, particularly in relation to the proposed new
system of creditor protection.
The proposed new legislation is likely to be followed by
other reforming legislation. Thus it is intended to abolish
the requirement of prior government approval for the
incorporation of a public or private company. This relic of
the old concession system governing the formation of
companies is intended to prevent fraud. The new proposals
concerning single tier board systems with executive and
non-executive or supervisory directions, which would
apply both to pubic and private companies, have already
been mentioned above, and will be further considered in
outline below. Legislation is also likely to be introduced
permitting companies to use electronic communication
systems for the purpose of calling and conducting general
meetings.
REFORMS OF PARTNERSHIP LAW
Partnerships are deﬁned in article 1655 of the Netherlands
Civil Code as agreements whereby two or more parties
contribute capital, labour or, for exampl,e, goods, rights or
goodwill with the purpose of making a proﬁt and
distributing such proﬁt among he participating partners.
Three forms of partnership may be distinguished under
Dutch law. These are the civil partnership (or maatschap),
the commercial partnership (vennootschap onder firma) and
the limited partnership (commanditaire vennootschaap). As is
the case in France and Germany, the civil partnership is
commonly used for purposes of the legal and medical
professions, and is at present governed by articles 1655-
1688 of the Netherlands Civil Code, which are (at the time
of writing) contained in Book 7 thereof. The civil
partnership may be of a silent (undisclosed) nature or
operate under a common name, as does the commercial
partnership, which has the object of conducting a business.
Special rules concerning the commercial partnership are
(at the time of writing) contained in articles 14-34 of the
Commercial Code (Wetboek van Koophandel), article 19 of
which now governs the limited partnership which has
managing partners who are jointly and severally liable for
the obligations of the partnership, and other partners who
are only liable to the extent of their contributions and who
cannot act on behalf of the partnership.
New legislation reforming the law of partnership will come
into force early in 2009. The new rules will be enacted as
Title 13 of Book 7 of the Civil Code and will replace those
mentioned above. The principal elements of the legislation
will be described brieﬂy. A partnership acting under a
common name will be empowered to acquire legal
personality by means, inter alia, of the execution of a
notarial deed, which will make it possible for the
partnership to hold property. The partnership will also be
empowered to terminate its legal personality. It will be
possible to transform a partnership having legal personality
into a private company. The transformation of a private
company into a partnership will also be possible. Whether
or not the partnership has legal personality, all partners in
a partnership acting under a common name (including a
maatschap) will be jointly and severally liable, except for the
limited partners in a limited partnership, who will
generally speaking be exempt from such liability.
PROPOSAL REGARDING A SINGLE TIER
BOARD SYSTEM
The above proposal is intended to make Dutch companies
more attractive internationally by introducing the option of
a single board system which combines both executive and
supervisory directors. The legislative proposal was made by
the Minister of Justice, Ernst Hirsch Ballen in March 2008,
and sent to various bodies for their comments. It is
proposed that Dutch public and private limited liability
companies will be able to opt for a dualistic model with a
supervisory and management board, as in Germany, or a
monistic model as described above. This option will not be
available where companies have to have a supervisory
board, as is the case with large companies and partly
exempt large companies. A large or “structure” company,
is deﬁned in articles 263(3) and 153(2) of Book 2 of the
Netherlands Civil Code. According to the balance sheet
together with the explanatory notes the issued share capital
must amount to a sum determined by Royal Decree, which
is raised periodically and now amounts to €16 million. The
company, or one dependent on it must, pursuant to a legal
obligation, have set up a works council. Such an obligation
is usually incumbent on companies employing at least 50
workers. Finally, the company, together with the dependent
companies, must together normally employ at least 100
persons in the Netherlands. Certain companies which
belong to groups of companies which include certain
international groups, are exempt from the requirement of
setting up a supervisory board contained in articles 168
and 258 of Book 2 of the Netherlands Civil Code. Such
fully exempt private companies may set up one voluntarily.
It is envisaged that the new law granting the option of a
single tier board system with executive and non-executive
directors will contain rules governing directors’ liability.
The advantage of a monistic or one tier model is the
simultaneous provision of information to all board
members. This does not apparently always occur under the
dual board system used in German public companies and
certain private ones. German supervisory boards have
sometimes met rather infrequently, and not taken a
sufﬁciently serious approach to their tasks. 31
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SOCIALLY ORIENTATED COMPANIES
The Minister of Justice has sent a legislative proposal
concerning the socially orientated company
(maatschappelijke onderneming) to various bodies for advice.
This new legal entity would be intended to enable bodies
in the public sector to act more decisively. An agreement
has been made between the different political parties
which participate in the coalition government in the
Netherlands that such an entity should be introduced.
It is proposed that it would be governed by a new Title 6A
introduced into Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code. The
socially orientated company would have a management
board and a supervisory board and a representative body
of interested parties (belanghebbendenvertegenwordiging). The
supervisory board would appoint the management board,
supervise its activities and offer it advice. The
representative body of interested parties would be entitled
to give advice on a number of management decisions
provided for by law, as well as on decisions stipulated in
the company’s articles. A dispute settlement procedure
might be invoked when the advice of the representative
body was not followed, or a decision was taken without its
approval when such approval was required. Furthermore,
the representative body would be entitled to initiate an
inquiry
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